manioc, yams, potatoes, as well as many delicious fruits. There is good water with which they make refreshing drinks; they have fowl which multiply in front of them; beef, goats, sheep and pigs for their meat supply and the sea furnishes them with fish. 3 De Baas's depiction of this colonial idyll was, in fact, disingenuous; in previous and subsequent years his correspondence to the Ministe`re de la Marine was overwhelmingly concerned with the privations suffered by colonists and slaves alike, and, on occasion, he himself actively circumvented the strict controls that forbade foreign (non-French) traders to sell their cargos on French islands, in order to alleviate their suffering. 4 More importantly, de Baas's report displayed an abrupt change in tone when it described the situation of the slaves who worked the sugar plantations of the French and who continued to develop the French colonial settlements that had been in place since 1626 in the case of St Christophe, and 1635 in the cases of Martinique and Guadeloupe. Here all was not well: exceptionally, de Baas asks Colbert's permission to send French merchants directly to Ireland to buy salted beef -'the most important commodity of all' -to feed the slaves, promising that the profits will be good. The famine may have forced the colonists out of their 'laziness and debauchery', but:
. . . to speak the truth, the beef that is lacking to feed the slaves is a calamity which they [the colonists] resent greatly -the rest is nothing by comparison. This is why, Monseigneur, depriving these people of all their commodities for another year, other than Irish beef, would be no great ill . . .
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Clearly there was a firm distinction to be made between the 'beef, goats, sheep and pigs' that could hypothetically supply colonists with meat, and the salted provisions from Ireland that were necessary for the enslaved population. Indeed, de Baas's letters to Colbert throughout his tenure (1667-77) testify over and over again to the centrality, specifically, of salted beef derived from Ireland to the African slaves, and to the effect of its absence. 6 In 1672, he summarized the situation that emerged during a temporary ban on trading in Irish beef:
I am daily tormented with trying to explain to you that if the prohibition on Irish beef continues, it is certain that the Islands couldn't be struck by a worse catastrophe, because if the slaves are lacking in beef, colonists will be lacking in slaves . . . . The Irish salted beef that de Baas isolates in relation to slave diets in the 1670s was a central element of the general colonial diet. The formal beginnings of French colonization in the region in 1626 had triggered a crisis in food provision that gained momentum mid-century after colonists turned from tobacco to sugar cultivation and began importing enslaved West Africans in vast numbers to work the plantations. Indeed, 'the inability to produce livestock, meat, flour and lumber in the West India islands laid the basis for one of the most serious commercial problems of the mercantilist empires'. 8 Despite de Baas's rather capricious reference to a plentiful meat supply on Martinique in his 1674 report, the colonial and slave diet was dominated by the indigenous and/or locally-grown foodstuffs he lists firstmanioc above all, but also peas, potatoes, yam, and plantain. An abundant, reliable and acceptable protein source remained elusive. Salted provisions were the basis of the naval diet of the first French privateers and mariners to settle the islands (as well as of other Europeans), and, in this way laid the basis for salt beef to become part of the general colonial diet. 9 Indeed, as a nineteenth-century historian of commerce in Bordeaux remarked about Irish beef: 'It was food of sailors, and in our colonies, most importantly that of slaves [ne`gres]'. 10 Nevertheless, this well-entrenched dietary practice cannot explain the significance of specifically Irish salt beef -le boeuf saled 'Irlande -in this French colonial context. In view of the mercantilist policies governing French trade under Colbert, Louis XIV and then Louis XV, it appears an extremely unlikely habit to have taken such firm hold.
But take hold it did -Irish salt beef was well known in the French Caribbean colonies during the ancien re´gime and to all those concerned with them. It was one of the few foodstuffs continually mentioned by name in the lists of goods imported into the islands, lists that appeared in official and non-official documents of the era. 11 Within France itself, the earliest edition of Jacques Savary's Le parfait negociant, an influential handbook for businessmen (1675) listed it simply as 'boeuf sale´' in the list of merchandise necessary to export to the French islands. 12 However, the equally influential Dictionnaire universel de commerce . . . (1723 edition), by his son Jacques Savary des Bruslons, later specified its provenance: 'Merchants from different ports of the Realm . . . carry considerable cargoes of salt beef to Martinique and other French islands in America, and they obtain almost all of it from Ireland, from where it is sent to them in barrels, ordinarily 200 pounds each'. 13 Salt beef even merited its own article in the 1717 Lettres patentes, the trade legislation that formed the backbone of the mercantilist pacte coloniale or l'Exclusif -a specific if somewhat oblique reference to the need to seek salted provisions from abroad for the American island colonies.
14 In addition, the strength and importance of the Franco-Irish-Caribbean trade networks centred on salt beef were renowned. The booming Irish provisions trade that developed mid seventeenth century and lasted slightly over a hundred years, specifically in relation to transatlantic European colonies, depended largely on French New World markets. 15 Equally, the salt beef imported from Ireland through the French ports with the strongest colonial trade links to the Franco-Caribbean in the ancien re´gime, Nantes, la Rochelle and particularly Bordeaux, for direct export to the colonies, had a dramatic effect on these urban economies. 16 A number of questions arise concerning this singular commodity and the set of transatlantic trade networks it set in motion that lasted throughout the pre-revolutionary eras in the French Caribbean. First, and most pressingly, what does it mean to investigate the slave as a consumer, instead of as a commodity and producer of commodities? What were the multiple effects of this massive and ever-growing Caribbean consumer population in Ireland and in France? After considering how Irish salt beef figured in a French Atlantic world of commodities centred on slaves and sugar, this paper follows that trail, beginning in Ireland, the place of production of salt beef, moving to the French Atlantic ports of Nantes, la Rochelle and Bordeaux which oversaw its passage, and ending in the Caribbean, its place of consumption.
Such a focus -using a single commodity and its production-toconsumption network to study historical relationships between places, objects and subjects -has characterized much recent work. Ian Cook's examination of papayas, for example, reveals the historical geographies of the social and commercial connections between Jamaica and England. 17 In Daniel Miller's project on Coca Cola in Trinidad, the soft drink emerges as something utterly local, indeed indigenized, confounding critics who claim that Coca Cola is unambiguously an instrument of American cultural hegemony. 18 In terms of the Atlantic world studies of alcohol have been particularly significant: David Hancock has examined how the transatlantic circulation of Madeira wine resulted in its 'product innovation'. 19 Other recent works have focused on Caribbean rum, 20 Portuguese wine and Brazilian sugar cane brandy. 21 Tracing these networks, in the Atlantic world as elsewhere, has multiple effects. In the first instance, it reveals hitherto unacknowledged relationships and dependencies between 'actors' in the commodity chain that are at odds with claims to national self-sufficiency and autonomy. So, for instance, following Irish salt beef to its place in the slave diet of the French Caribbean gives the lie to narrow readings of French absolutism and mercantilism that ostensibly demanded the exclusion of foreigners from the French trading sphere. Secondly, tracing these trajectories is a valuable way of tracking the transformation in material value of the commodities themselves. Although le boeuf sale´d'Irlande most often appeared as a single commodity, it was of course made up of a conglomeration of commodities -beef, salt, wood and iron, to begin with -each of which had complex and intertwined histories of production and provision. Moreover, the salt beef itself was a differentiated item, and it took on different meanings as it moved from Ireland to the Caribbean. Arjun Appadurai argues that it is 'things-in-motion that illuminate their human and social context', and that '. . . it is only through the analysis of these trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions and calculations that enliven things'. 22 This study of the transatlantic trajectory of salt beef provides evidence for a vibrant Atlantic trading network that brought wealth to a range of Irish and French Atlantic port cities, wealth derived from the slave labour of the Caribbean. It marks the cultural, economic and material exchanges between these corners of the early modern world, and the transformations in value that accompanied the passage of an exceptional commodity.
SUGAR AND SALT BEEF
The West African slaves who made possible the shift from tobacco to sugar cultivation on the French Caribbean islands in the 1650s were the backbone of the plantation societies emerging in late seventeenth-century Martinique and Guadeloupe. The largest French Caribbean possessionSaint-Domingue, on the western part of the island of Hispaniola where permanent Spanish settlements had existed since 1494 -was ceded formally to France in 1697 and the shift to sugar there was faster and more complete than in the other French territories. At its peak between 1763 and 1791 Saint-Domingue, the 'pearl of the Antilles', produced higher profits from sugar for the French than those produced by any other sugar colony, and allowed the French to outstrip the British in sugar and sugar profits in this period. 23 The overall economic impact on France during these years cannot be exaggerated; with sugar as the key object of exchange '. . . colonial trade was the most dynamic sector of the French economy'. 24 The entire sugar apparatus was of course based on the enslaved labour force that lived and worked in the French Antilles. At the outbreak of the Haitian Revolution in 1791, the hitherto unseen demographic ratio of SaintDomingue (approximately ten slaves to each white person) 25 was a clear indication of at least two things: first, quite simply, that the higher the number of slaves, the more sugar and profit; and second, that there was no limit unless perhaps geographic to how far French plantation owners would expand their operations, nor to their exploitation of enslaved humans.
In this context, slaves themselves were commodities who, concurrently, were the producers of the commodity for which the elaborate and precarious plantation system had developed: sugar. Indeed, the letters, administrative acts and merchants' manuals directed at the development of the French sugar colonies listed salt beef from Ireland and 'ne`gres' from the Guinea Coast as necessary exports to the islands in almost the same breath. Timeconsuming, dangerous and expensive as enslaved West Africans were to procure and troublesome as they often were, without them there could be no sugar, and there could be no turning away from the transatlantic trade in them without renouncing the vast profits that were enriching western Europe during these pre-revolutionary years. However, if slaves were at the centre of a series of complex relationships with commodities, there is a third aspect to this knot that deserves attention -that of slaves as consumers of commodities. Because of their massive and dominant number, slaves contributed to and affected the production-consumption cycle that resulted in a global sugar economy in often-unexplored ways. John Clark summarized this cycle as follows:
. . . slaves produced the colonial staples that European consumers demanded and consumed the European goods sent in exchange. Harsh working conditions killed slaves quickly so that replacements were constantly required, and expanding plantation agriculture generated further demands for new labor. Thus, slaves were at once producers, consumers, and commodities, and the slave trade was the lynchpin of the entire system. 26 The first order of these 'European goods sent in exchange' and consumed by slaves was foodstuffs; this obvious fact is often noted in histories of slavery and its place in the Atlantic economies, but just as often passed over in favour of analyses of sugar or other tropical export commodities, their movement and their effects. French historian Jean-Pierre Poussou encapsulates this relationship: 'The rise of the Atlantic system is inseparable from the development of land in the Americas. The products the Americas furnished and the needs of the populations that had been brought there are what brought about the greater part of maritime Atlantic activity'. As do many others, Poussou explicitly prioritizes sugar over 'the needs of the population' in his examination of the Atlantic system, noting the fact that sugar was 'the motor' of the Atlantic economies until the end of the eighteenth century. 27 Conversely, focusing on slaves as consumers, and studying the goods they consumed and the patterns of their consumption, generates a different history. The understudied social world of slaves becomes more nuanced and slaves themselves are seen not only as producers of sugar and sugar profits, but also as agents who collectively set in motion a series of economic, material and cultural exchanges felt in the French Atlantic ports of Nantes, la Rochelle, Bordeaux, Cap Franc¸ais, St Pierre, and Basse-Terre, but also in the ports of Cork, Dublin, Belfast and Waterford, and their hinterlands. In terms of the commodities themselves, salt beef (and wheat flour, eau-devie, salt cod and butter) must be considered as material corollaries of sugar. The thousands of barrels of refined and unrefined sugar shipped legally from the French Caribbean ports to the French Atlantic ports and the ports of la Nouvelle France (and illegally to the British colonies of the North American mainland) were made possible by the thousands of barrels of salted beef that traced a transatlantic network between Irish ports, French ports, and the Caribbean. Much as Sidney Mintz's pivotal Sweetness and Power (1985) examined sugar and the histories of its production in the Caribbean in relation to the long-lasting changes it wrought in western European and North American societies, 28 salt beef produced in Ireland can be investigated for its historical connections to the construction of a 'new world' in the Caribbean. There is a growing historical literature on the slaves of the French sugar colonies as producers and as commodities, 29 but the third integral aspect to the social histories of slavery -slaves as consumers -has received much less direct attention. The recent work of Judith Carney on African agency in the importation of rice throughout the New World stands out for its notable contributions in this direction. 30 Her attention to the distinction between commodities and subsistence, and the function of such a distinction, is particularly valuable:
Most modern scholarship focuses on the role of rice as a commodity. But this view does not engage the cereal's prior importance as a subsistence staple. Subsistence in the history of the Black Atlantic represents something more than the food grown on plantation provision fields and the garden plots allotted slaves. Subsistence also pertains to the sustenance of generations of Africans, mariners, slaves, plantation fugitives, soldiers and colonial officials. The feeding of these multitudesall involved in the globalizing economy by consent or coercion -is not readily visible from the vantage point of the plantation export economy. In shifting the perspective from commodity to subsistence, [I] draw attention to the early presence of rice in the Black Atlantic and the context that shaped its adoption as a foodstaple in the Americas. It illuminates the role of the initial, founding generations of enslaved Africans . . .
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As she argues, histories of the food-consumption patterns of African labourers provide empirical evidence of the social worlds that were developing alongside the meteoric rise of the Atlantic sugar economies. Moreover, tracing the transatlantic trajectories of the commodities they consumed demonstrates the global effects of their huge numbers, as well the historical intricacies of a feeding an enslaved and entirely displaced workforce. As John Parry has commented about slaves in Jamaica, '[t]heir economic history, in particular, should be the story of yams, cassava and salt fish, no less than sugar and tobacco'. 32 
COMMODITIES AND NETWORKS
To understand the effects of salt beef (and of yams, cassava and salt fish) it is necessary to consider their status as commodities. Appadurai has defined the commodity most simply as an object of economic value, with the added dimension of the 'commodity situation' which he describes as the phase that some objects enter and pass through as part of the process of becoming commodities. 33 To focus on this temporary commodity state, he argues:
. . . means looking at the commodity potential of all things rather than searching fruitlessly for the magic distinction between commodities and other sorts of things. It also means breaking significantly with the production-dominated Marxian view of the commodity and focusing on its total trajectory from production, through exchange/distribution, to consumption. 34 Appadurai's approach opened the way for current studies of commodity cultures and of consumption concerned with describing the connections between producers and consumers and the active potential of such links. Dispersed geographically across continents and oceans, argue Deborah Leslie and Suzanne Reimer, these links contribute to the production of space. This can occur because these links . . . emanate from diverse geographical contexts [that] are not only different but intertwined. Further emphasis needs to be placed on the dialectical relationships between [commodity] chains and their national, regional and local contexts. . . . The nation is not merely a place where processes of consumption happen, but rather is itself constructed out of these same processes. 35 This study of the transatlantic networks of Irish salt beef argues, in fact, that as well as producing nations, commodities and the links they create are capable of producing more diffuse spaces, such as that of the ancien re´gime French Atlantic. As Miles Ogborn has noted, 'considering the Atlantic as the space of investigation, unlike other otherwise complementary approaches to transnationalism or diasporic space . . . suggests an attention to the . . . material world. It signals a geography . . . defined by the materials that have provided for cultivation, production and consumption'. 36 The Atlantic world created by European colonial settlements in the Americas was above all else a place where material objects (in many cases commodities) circulated and settled, and were developed and transformed.
IRELAND
Key among these commodities was salt beef that originated in Ireland. At its place of production, salt beef must be seen as only one of the many foodstuffs of a thriving Irish provisions trade that supplied the British and French colonies in the Americas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and operated on a scale unmatched by any other single country trading in the Atlantic world. 37 The Irish provisions trade as a whole was made up of salted beef and pork, butter, fish, hides, skins and tallow, as well as other items like cheese, beer, bread, candles, and pickled tongues. 38 Its extraordinary growth followed the growth of the plantation economies based on sugar of the British and French Caribbean islands (and, to a lesser extent, the British mainland of North America), and through this trade 'Ireland was propelled into an expanding Atlantic economy'. 39 Whether the provisions supplied by Ireland were shipped to the Americas directly from Irish ports, or via British or French ports for immediate re-export to their colonies, they were largely consumed in the European colonies of the Americas or on board vessels destined for them, not on the continent itself. Indeed the British and French domestic markets for Irish provisions diminished steadily at the end of the seventeenth century and into the eighteenth. 40 There is clearly a reciprocal relationship of economic growth between Ireland, via its provisions trade, and the Atlantic colonies. 41 The general economic patterns of the provisions trade are borne out by the example of salt beef, in the direct correlation that existed between the growth of the tropical sugar economies in the mid seventeenth century and the expansion of the colonial market for salt beef. Cullen writes:
Once plantations of sugar expanded rapidly from the 1650s, the economic significance of the colonial possessions in the West Indies immediately became obvious. . . . It was more economic to employ [a] scarce and expensive [enslaved] labour force to produce sugar and to rely on cheap imports to feed the inhabitants. One of the main foodstuffs imported from Europe was beef, heavily salted so that it would preserve in the long and slow voyage across the warm waters of the middle Atlantic . . . The market was small to start with but largely as a result of its rapid expansion in the late 1650s and early 1660s, exports of salt beef from Ireland were twice as large in 1665 as in 1641. They more than doubled again by 1683. 42 The operative word in the text above is 'cheap'. The reason for the success of Irish salt beef, as with all Irish provisions, was its cheapness relative to other sources of supplies. In addition to the expansion of the colonial markets, the Cattle Acts of 1663 and 1667, enacted to protect English cattle breeders by effectively prohibiting the export of cattle and cattle products from Ireland to England, drastically lowered the price of beef in Ireland available for sale and export in the form of salt beef. 43 The incipient provisions trade benefited greatly from this change in prices, and Irish landlords themselves saw exports to France, despite the fact that England and France were at war, as a means to profit from the Cattle Acts. 44 Other factors that brought the price of salt beef down in Ireland and kept it low were good internal transport, the availability of large tracts of fertile land for pasture close to port cities, and, indeed, the lack of other kinds of industry. 45 Before the colonial markets developed mid-century, a large number of minor ports served the export trade, but by the 1680s, the Atlantic provisions trade had become settled in a small number of ports. The saltbeef industry specifically was centred in the port cities and towns of Cork, Dublin, Belfast, and to a lesser extent, Waterford. 46 Cork, in particular, became the centre of beef production: here, 'specialization, low wages and advance techniques of processing combined to allow more efficient production than in any other Atlantic port'; 47 and in 1686, for example, Cork's annual shipment of salt beef (16,960 barrels) represented half of Ireland's entire colonial beef export. 48 The argument about mutual dependency and reciprocity made about the Irish provisions trade in general with the rise of the Atlantic sugar economies can also be made here for Irish salt beef, and this is one of the central factors contributing to its exceptional status as a commodity. That is, if the tropical colonial markets gave rise to an Irish salt-beef industry on an unprecedented scale, so too did salt beef dominate the imports into the West Indies: 'Irish beef, most of it from the Cork region, was the largest single West Indian import well into the eighteenth century'. 49 The economic and demographic impact of the provisions trade on the Irish ports in question was immediate and of great consequence -Cork, for example, grew to be the most cosmopolitan port in Ireland, out of which developed the only sizable banking system in the country, and saw its population multiply several times over during the eighteenth century. 50 The salt-beef industry was a seasonal one. The slaughter of cattle took place between August and October, depending on their weight. 51 Weight determined the grade of salt beef that was produced, and here the differentiation that marks it as a commodity began. There were three basic grades: 'small beef' -the lowest -was derived from the smallest cattle; 'cargo beef' or 'common mess beef' from heavier animals; and the highest grade -'best mess beef' -was produced from the heaviest animals, slaughtered last. The beef was cut into eight pound pieces, graded, salted and packed into casks, the lower grades receiving more of the unpopular pieces such as necks and shanks. The casks were left to stand for four or five days and then sealed by a cooper, after which time they were weighed; records were kept by the merchants who organized the industry.
Each of these steps involved a variety of other commodities, each with its own chain of production and provision. The salt used in the procedure is perhaps the most notable because of its own cosmopolitan and transatlantic histories in the early modern era. 52 Salt from Portugal, Spain or the southwest of France was generally preferred because it was particularly dry and light. 53 Ireland paid much less duty on imported salt than England (one-tenth the duty during the eighteenth century), thus seriously increasing Ireland's competitiveness in this trade, and decreasing that of England, throughout this period. 54 A central weakness in French attempts to encourage a domestic salt-beef industry directly concerned salt.
The historical vicissitudes of the French salt tax, la gabelle, made it expensive to buy and transport from remote French locations, while the damp, grey salt from Brittany and the Atlantic regions was widely reported to be of lower quality. The high price of salt thus contributed to the higher price of producing salt beef in France. Indeed, one Irish resident in Nantes, M. Carmichael, 55 who attempted to launch a salt-beef processing operation there, was unable to source Portuguese salt. His resulting salt beef held up badly on the long transatlantic crossing and was rejected on the basis that it spoiled because of the inferior, local sel de Gue´rande. 56 This pattern of importing 'high-quality' dry, white Portuguese salt into Ireland added at least one more complex site on the Irish salt-beef commodity network.
The perception (and reality) of the difference in quality observed in salt extends more generally to Irish salt beef, as indicated by the grading of beef cattle prior to slaughter, and of the barrelled beef, once salted. Most central here is the link between this hierarchy of grades and the ultimate destination of much of Ireland's salt beef, the slaves of the French Caribbean sugar colonies. The lowest quality of Irish beef -the 'small beef' -was destined for the French market, a fact observed on both sides of the Channel. 57 Writing about the high proportion of Cork's export market in salt beef sold to the French in the mid 1750s and the effect an English embargo on these exports would have, one English commentator remarked that:
. . . the French do generally take from Cork about one-third of all exports of beef, . . . This from March, 1753, to March, 1754, consisted of 61,711 barrels . . . The greatest part of what they take is of the worst kind; bullocks and cows which do not weigh more than three and three-quarter hundred-weight per carcass, and which before the late embargo was sold at 10/6 per hundred-weight, whereas the cargoes salted for our colonies, are made up of oxen weighing four hundred-weight and a half, or upwards, and was worth before the embargo 12/6 per hundred-weight.
He goes on to explain the phenomenon: '. . . [the French] make no other use of it, but for the nourishment of their negroes, to whom they are obliged, by edicts of their grand monarch, to allow 3 pounds of beef per week'. 58 This 'small beef' or 'French beef' was considered 'not fit for the Use of Government or our [British] Sugar Colonies', 59 but was purchased by the French for their colonies. The reference to the edict of 'the grand monarch' is, of course, to Louis XIV's infamous 1685 Code Noir, the code that governed the treatment of slaves by slave-owners. Several articles of the Code treated the food requirements that planters were mandated to provide their slaves; one was the provision of 'two pounds of salt meat' (deux livres de boeuf sale)' or its equivalent. 60 By way of contrast, slaves in the Anglo-Caribbean did not eat large quantities of salted meat, being supplied in the main with salt fish from Newfoundland or New England; the main consumers of Irish salt beef in the British West Indies were white planters and settlers. 61 In France, the low standard of beef coming from Ireland was also observed, although without the explicit link between the high volume of imports and the population ultimately consuming it. Savary des Bruslons also comments on the poor quality of Irish beef, but blames the inherently corrupt nature of Irish businessmen:
. . . salted meat is sold by weight, and it is one of our best trades with the Island [Ireland.] But foreigners must be on their guard when they purchase their merchandise, and this holds true for everything they buy from the Irish; these provincial merchants [Insulaires] have no scruples about adding all matter of substances to increase the weight [of goods]; such as knotted hair in leather . . . tallow in butter, pebbles in tallow and the horns and feet of cattle in barrels of salted meat. 62 The author of Observations on the Embargo . . . was reflecting on the 1756 embargo laid by the English on Irish exports to France during the Seven Years War, and his concern was with the build-up of 'small beef' in Cork, unsaleable to other markets because of its poor quality. It was commonly assumed that these periodic embargoes on trade in salt beef between Ireland and France were, in fact, more intended to enrich English competitors than anything else, but their influence was marked nonetheless. The twenty-four embargoes in the years following the first general one, issued in 1740 at the outbreak of the War of Austrian Succession (1741-1748), were mostly short-lived; the exception is the general embargo imposed from 1776 to 1778, 'one of the most celebrated events in Irish commercial history'. 63 The immediate effect was increased smuggling from the mainland of North America and increased trade via neutral ports in the Caribbean such as St Eustatius and St Thomas. However, both general export values and salt-beef export values, before and after 1740, do follow the pattern of embargoes: the number of exported barrels falls to zero only during the Wars of Spanish and Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War. 64 On the other hand, at the height of this commerce, between 1718 and 1754, France replaced England as Ireland's chief trading partner in salt beef more than a dozen times. At this point, 'exports of beef to France were then two to four times their levels of the 1680s and accounted for 40 to 60 per cent of total Irish exports of beef', which included exports to Spain, Holland, Flanders and the Baltic countries. 65 This massive expansion in trade is directly related to the French expansion of their sugar colonies, and more specifically to the development of Saint-Domingue sugar plantations and the influx of hundreds of thousands of West African enslaved labourers during this period. According to Cullen:
The [Irish beef] market was, at first, limited by the relatively slow rate of colonial expansion. The quickening demand for beef in the 1720s was due to the acceleration in plantation sugar output and population at that time. In fact, the expansion of the sugar plantations on the French colony of St Domingue . . . was exclusively responsible for the improvement in relative prices of beef in the mid-twenties. Indeed, in the 1720s and 1730s exports of beef rose simply because the rise in exports to France exceeded some decline in exports to other destinations. 66 The following section of the paper follows Irish beef to France to investigate the effect of this commodity there. The consuming public represented by these enslaved multitudes stimulated a trade that wrought remarkable changes, both in the French port cities the Irish beef moved through, and more generally to the colonial trade policies that had developed in conjunction with France's expansion in the Americas. First, this section examines the resident Irish communities that developed in these cities and their facilitation of the trade. Second, it explores Colbert's early efforts to encourage a domestic salt-beef industry so as to maintain French hegemony, the failure of these attempts and the ways salt beef from Ireland subsequently compelled the rewriting and overwriting of mercantilist trade regulations.
FRANCE
Until the French Antilles shifted into sugar production, salt beef was only one of many products entering France from Ireland destined for French colonies. The trade in these provisions in the second half of the seventeenth century centred on the ports of Saint-Malo and La Rochelle. The possibility of return cargoes to Ireland of wine, brandy and salt at the latter port, in particular, assured its qualified success into the eighteenth century. Both ports were eclipsed by Nantes (the main French Atlantic slaving port) and more particularly by Bordeaux as the century progressed, however, and return cargoes -primarily, wine, eaux-de-vie, brandy, and prunescontinued to be vital: By contrast [to Nantes], Bordeaux had a large export trade in wine to Ireland, and the wine trade seems to have grown more rapidly than its imports of beef and butter in the first quarter of the [eighteenth] century. The prospect of return cargoes influenced the establishment of merchants . . . attracted to Bordeaux in the first instance by its soaring wine trade.' 67 Officially, by the time Bordeaux began to dominate the market in Irish salt beef, many Atlantic ports were open to this commodity. In June of 1688, the Conseil d'É tat of Louis XIV had passed an arreˆt (decree) imposing a weighty duty of five livres per hundredweight on imports of salt beef from Irelandthe regular tax was 40 sols -but the outrage of merchants in this trade forced the Crown to issue a second decree six months later, removing the duty from imports entering five favoured ports, Bordeaux, La Rochelle, Nantes, SaintMalo and Le Havre. 68 Brest was added to this list by a decree of 1704; the list in Louis XV's 1717 Lettres Patentes du Rois portant Reglement pour le Commerce des Colonies Francoises (the guidelines which would dominate the regulation of French colonial trade until 1789), included thirteen named ports; and it continued lengthening as the century progressed. In all cases, the legislation stipulated that this commodity -salt beef coming from Irelandwas for immediate re-export to the 'French islands of America' only, and was therefore exempt from high import duty. The beef had to be warehoused under specific conditions during its stay in France: the December 1688 decree used language that would be repeated in all the related legislation:
. . . the King and his Council orders that salt Beef from Ireland which enters France through the Ports of le Havre, Nantes, Saint-Malo, la Rochelle and Bordeaux, and which is declared for French Islands of America, will be exempt from the 1688 duty imposed by the Council, on the condition that while waiting to be loaded on to Vessels destined for the said Islands, it will be warehoused in a Store locked by two different keys, one to be placed in the hands of the Clerk of the Justice of the cinq grosses fermes 69 and the other to be kept by the Merchants, or their named representative . . .
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This text clearly indicates that Irish salt beef was not simply liable to rules that generally regulated import of goods from Ireland. Rather, it was treated as an exceptional commodity, defined as much by its specific provenance and destination as by its status as an internationally traded good.
The import of salt beef into France from Ireland was to significant degree controlled by resident Irish communities in Bordeaux, Nantes and La Rochelle, unlike the export of salt beef from Cork and Dublin which was not influenced at all by resident French merchants. The histories of these Irish communities in France provide rich narratives for the exploration of diasporic settlement and early modern commerce, both stimulated in this case by the consumption demands of the enslaved labour of the French sugar colonies. 71 The Irish merchant community in Bordeaux in particular managed that port's meteoric development of the trade in salt beef and other provisions, and expanded because of it. French economic historian Paul Butel describes the salt-beef and wine trade there, and the '. . . vital role played by the British colony since the beginning of the eighteenth century: as of 1715, its involvement in wine exports was matched by its participation in the trade to the Islands in indispensable Irish salted provisions, either sent through Bordeaux, or obtained directly by French merchant vessels [armateurs] from Cork or Dublin'. 72 The 'British colony' to which Butel refers was dominated by Irish merchant families, and this was also true of the English-speaking communities established throughout the port cities of southern Europe and Spain. 73 Cullen notes that the growth of these Irish diasporic settlements was due as much to successful commercial networks established through family ties across national boundaries as to political or religious persecution at home. Often different branches of the same family would reside in Cork or Dublin and in Bordeaux, facilitating links created from the provisions trade. Indeed, as John Mannion has discovered, some Irish families had members based throughout the Atlantic world -'. . . beef merchants [in Waterford] emphasized the West Indies, the continent and London. . . . Dominick Farrell and his son Thomas emphasized Bordeaux and Cadiz, where branches of the family resided'. 74 In another study, Mannion investigates the Aylwards, an Irish family active in the colonial provisions trade which had family members resident in Plaisance -centre of the French cod fishery in Newfoundland -as well as in Nantes, Cadiz and Waterford. 75 Cullen expands on the early importance of the Waterford connection to the French Atlantic port cities, observing, though, that as the wine and then beef markets grew in the eighteenth century, the Irish community in Bordeaux came to be dominated by those with connections in Cork and Dublin, and these connections then extended to other ports along the French and Spanish Atlantic coasts.
In this way, the soaring demand for salt beef in the French colonies contributed to the commercial success and continued growth of Irish expatriate merchant communities, which established themselves and developed in relation to their ability to facilitate this expanding trade. This direct relationship is shown by nothing as clearly as by the decline of the trade, which began at the outbreak of the revolutions in France and Saint-Domingue. Although the effects of the revolutions on the wine and brandy trades were more diffuse, the loss of the Saint-Domingue market brought the Franco-Irish trade in salt beef to an abrupt close. In France, the history of the Franco-Irish salt-beef trade reveals more, however, than the growth of Irish merchant communities in the Atlantic port cities. Food provision in general is an especially effective angle from which to consider French colonial trade policy, from its early formulations under Colbert and then as it coalesced into l'Exclusif after the Lettres patentes of 1717. It is effective because while the primary concern of the mercantilist policy governing the early modern colonial ventures of all European powers was to reserve profits generated by the trade in tropical commodities for the home country, 77 the provision of food (as well as of slaves and other material staples not obtainable locally) was -at least, in theory -the 'duty' the home country owed its colonies in return. 78 It is in the provision of food that the glaring deficiencies of this system of exchange are revealed and the falsity of this 'reciprocity' exposed. Indeed, it is the provision of food -and often of Irish salt beef -to which historians of French colonial trade point when emphasizing that this system of commercial exclusion was never, in fact, exclusive, and existed throughout the ancien re´gime in conjunction with a vibrant and growing contraband trade, l'interlope. 79 In this regard, it is illuminating to observe how Colbert himself treated the breach of the French mercantile sphere that salt beef produced in Ireland represented. Later, too, a series of exceptional decrees relating to Irish salt beef were passed from the 1720s to 1740s -a period of expansion in the French Antilles -that reversed the restrictive trade legislation by then firmly in place.
Before Colbert came to power as intendant of finance of France in 1661, 80 the salt beef consumed in the French Caribbean had been obtained directly from Ireland, bought there primarily by private Dutch merchants, shipped directly to the islands and sold to local administrators and colonists. 81 One of Colbert's first concerns was to eliminate all foreign involvement in the development of the French colonial possessions, and he intended to do this through controlling trade in the region. To this end, in 1664 he formed the Compagnie des indes occidentales (CIO), responsible for supplying the French Caribbean colonies with what that they needed from the Old World, including food provisions, building materials and slaves. 82 However, it also meant eliminating Ireland from this transatlantic network and bringing this crucial trade fully within French control. Within a year the royal administration was encouraging the production of salt beef in France for export to the islands in order to bypass the Dutch/Irish trade. To this end a proclamation by Louis XIV's Conseil d'Etat in February 1665 forbade the mayor of Bordeaux to levy the 'cloven-hoof tax' on:
. . . beasts that the Company [CIO] are having brought into the city from places throughout the province of Guyenne to be there preserved in salt, and subsequently stowed on vessels which the Company is sending to the American islands. It is hardly reasonable to levy such a tax seeing as the beasts and commodities in question are not to be sold in the Kingdom, but serve to feed and sustain the inhabitants of these islands. 83 Colbert's attempts to promote a direct trade in salt beef between France and its Caribbean possessions soon gained momentum. In late 1670 and into 1671 he wrote a series of letters to Brunet, director of the CIO, urging him to buy only beef raised and salted within France.
84 Despite Brunet's best intentions, however, he apparently met with significant obstacles, as in subsequent letters Colbert was both appealing to him to not be discouraged and promising that for every 4000 barrels of French salt beef delivered to the islands, the king would give the CIO a bounty of 4000 e´cus.
Brunet's main problem was that of price -French beef was inescapably more expensive that Irish beef, for reasons outlined above. Colbert insisted that French beef was superior and the price would come down if they were successful in their efforts. As encouragement to Brunet and incentive to the French salt-beef industry, in August Colbert and Louis XIV issued a proclamation forbidding the warehousing of Irish salt beef on the Isle de Rhe´, near the port of La Rochelle. Through 1671 Colbert persevered with Brunet; but his language in the final letter in the series is almost identical to that in the earlier letters, which indicates perhaps how little progress was being made: 'In regard to the beef that needs to be sent to the islands, do not be disheartened by the difficulties you are encountering in excluding beef from Ireland. We must pay whatever price is required, and I am very satisfied with your attention to these matters.' 85 Acts of royal administration threw legal weight behind Colbert's words to Brunet. The most important, a proclamation in November 1671, unequivocally prohibited the export of all foreign salt beef to the islands.
His Majesty has issued decrees and statutes forbidding all foreign commerce in the islands of the Americas inhabited by his subjects, . . . [but has been informed that] most French vessels which traffic there under his permission, and that of the Compagnie des Indes occidentales, are found to have cargos of beef, bacon, canvas and other merchandise from foreign countries, which is directly in contravention with his wishes. His Majesty is most strongly forbidding all French merchants trafficking on these islands to transport there meat or any other merchandise purchased in a foreign country . . .
86
Towards the same end in January and February 1672, as France headed into the Dutch War, bounties were offered -four livres tournois for every barrel of salt beef produced in France and exported to the colonies -in an attempt to make it profitable for private French traders to replace the CIO, now on the verge of bankruptcy. None of these measures achieved anything close to what Colbert had intended, and ultimately he realized that his efforts to exclude Ireland from this trade had failed and were in fact endangering the colonies. On 10 May 1673, the ban was lifted by royal proclamation. Even after the war ended, in 1678, Colbert did not resume promotion of a domestic salt-beef industry and ten years later the legislation of 1688 officially acknowledged -indeed, attempted to profit from -the critical importance of Ireland in this commodity network.
Colbert died in 1683, succeeded as minister of the Marine by his son Seignelay, who carried on his work within a mercantilist framework that was evolving to the advantage of private French traders entrenched in the Atlantic port cities of Bordeaux, Nantes and La Rochelle. 87 Throughout the ancien re´gime, trade within the French empire was governed by l'Exclusif, the set of rules stipulating that commerce only take place between the French colonies and the metropole, to the profit of France, whether French private traders or public chartered companies. Following these rules, as the trade in Irish salt beef developed the bulk of the meat was bought, sold and transported between key Irish and French ports, where it was temporarily warehoused (as we have seen) and finally shipped by French merchants across the Atlantic and sold on the islands.
However, for several years in the first half of the eighteenth century, demand for Irish salt beef in the French American colonies was so great that a specific set of decrees was enacted to permit direct trade, at a level hitherto unheard of, between the Franco-Caribbean islands and Ireland. In December 1727, a period of peace on the Continent and exponential growth of the sugar colonies in the Antilles, a decree was issued permitting '. . . French merchants who trade with the French islands and colonies of America, for the period of one year only, to send their vessels directly to Ireland to buy there salt beef, and to transport this cargo directly back to the said islands and colonies . . .'
88 French merchants were thus allowed to bypass warehousing the beef in French Atlantic ports, and the French government could not collect its albeit negligible import duty. That is, French merchants operating out of Atlantic ports were permitted to send their vessels to Ireland and then to sail to the French islands in the Caribbean directly from Cork or Dublin. More importantly the integrity of the French economic sphere, within which all colonial possessions had to operate, was formally broken. In February 1730 this allowance was extended for another year, and similar decrees were issued up until 1741 and the outbreak of the War of Austrian Succession (1741-1748). 89 Remarkably, the original December 1727 decree was issued only two months after another, tighter and stricter version of Louis XV's 1717 Lettres patentes. The new regulations repeated the mercantilist injunctions of 1717, but they intensified the prohibitions on trade with foreigners and increased penalties for contravention. In the 1727 Lettres patentes Irish salt beef was specifically named. The first article of the first book of this legislation forbade any '. . . subject born in the Realm or the Colonies to import any merchandise, effect, Negro or commodity from any foreign country or colony to be introduced to Our Colonies, with the exception nonetheless of salt Meat from Ireland which will be transported by French vessels which will have loaded their cargo in ports of the Realm . . .' 90 Two months later, the stipulation that Irish beef be brought to France before being shipped onwards to the Caribbean was overturned, beginning a unprecedented period of direct trade that would last fourteen years. As Cullen observes, 'between 1727 and 1741 French vessels outward bound for the Americas were accorded by French law the quite exceptional permission of calling to Irish ports to load beef directly for the colonies.' 91 This reversal is clearly connected to the rapid increase of populations in the French Caribbean islands, in particular of the African slaves required by the expanding sugar economies. As an indication of the numbers involved, James Pritchard calculates the total population of the French West Indies and Guiana in 1730 to have been 195,073 (of which 160,278 were black slaves), a figure almost double the 1715 population. 92 A generation later, according to Stanley Engerman, this slave population had almost doubled again: the total French colonial population in 1750 was 323,433, of which 281,658 were black slaves. 93 The dietary regime forced upon these enslaved Africans and new-world creoles of African descent -one derived from the naval diet of French sailors and merchant seamen -had enormous repercussions across the Atlantic as this consuming population grew exponentially. These repercussions included not only the vastly increased vitality of the Irish provisions trade in Ireland, as we have seen, but also the growth of Irish merchant communities across the French Atlantic world, especially in Bordeaux, Nantes and La Rochelle. In addition, as France was unable to compete in this expanding market, French dependence on trading links with Ireland continued. A close scrutiny of some of the details of this trade in the eighteenth century -such as the 1727-41 direct-trade legislation -reveals the complexities of French mercantilist policy, too often assumed to be monolithic and one-dimensional.
THE CARIBBEAN
When the trajectory of Irish salt beef is followed across the Atlantic and the geographical focus shifts to its place of consumption, the French-occupied islands in the Caribbean basin, the nature of the available evidence changes significantly. In Ireland and France, salt beef's archival trail is based on administrative acts, correspondence between the King and his ministers, letters and petitions from producers and distributors, memos from different levels of government, and port archival records, all registering the movement and value of the commodity. On the islands of Saint-Domingue, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Saint-Vincent and the others, however, no records exist that register the impressions of those who consumed it in the amounts that made it such a valuable and strategic commodity. French slave narratives do not exist that document the French slave world and slaveholding habits as do English narratives for the British slave world. 94 Accounts of the place of salt beef in the colonial diet gathered from the Caribbean itself must be constructed from other kinds of documents. These, however, are legion: notably letters from local administrators and officials, and travel accounts of those who voyaged through the region in this period, especially French Jesuit and Dominican missionaries. Despite the quantity of these sources, the lack of any direct evidence provided by the slaves themselves remains a glaring absence.
Inevitably, there is a disjuncture between the pictures formed through the Irish and French accounts of salt beef, and the ones that take shape through the primary materials produced in the Caribbean. The economic histories of the production, management and distribution of Irish salt beef, of the role of the French market in its commodity development and of how French authorities treated it convey a sense of surplus, even excess. The documents and histories outlined in the earlier sections of this paper present evidence of its flourishing market, of continuing and exponential growth, and of the huge numbers of French vessels crossing the Atlantic loaded with this particular commodity, among many others, to assist the development of the French colonies.
While the centrality of salt beef in colonial dietary regimes remains dominant in Caribbean accounts, the idea of surplus or excess is not, nor is salt beef associated with a sense of potential growth and colonial development. Indeed, the impression unequivocally given by all records describing the place of salt beef in colonial, particularly slave, diets is of shortages, of famine, and of overall scarcity. Equally, these primary documents portray the ruinous greed and short-sightedness of colonists (plantation managers for the most part) who chose to underfeed labour forces in order to maximize profits -such is the conclusion Gabriel Debien draws over and over from his research into the food practices of the slaves of St Domingue:
Multiple and precise testimonials and the repeated threats of local and royal decrees towards colonists who neglected the support of their slaves -these documents have a matchless eloquence that expresses a single idea: bad food and malnourishment were the great affliction of slavery in Saint-Domingue, the central evil. 95 The main piece of royal legislation to which Debien refers here -the Code Noir -was enacted to prevent such negligence. It was ignored outright or minimally enforced, with few consequences for the slave-owners. Certainly the general rule of colonists' negligence in favour of their own profit could be applied to the entire world of foodways that developed in the Franco-Caribbean, and to which African slaves were forcibly introduced; it applied equally to ways other foodstuffs (manioc, plantain, yam) were cultivated and distributed, and to the kind of agency slaves were permitted in relation to organizing their own means of sustenance. However, it is instructive to observe how this universal attitude of greed and negligence was embodied in the specific ways in which Irish salt beef was managed and consumed. The accounts produced in the place of the consumption of salt beef then illuminate the bleakest point in this commodity chain and a central characteristic of colonial development more generally.
Salt beef was a staple in all early colonial diets in the French Caribbean, those of African slaves, les engage´s (white French indentured labourers), and the planters themselves. In the course of the eighteenth century it was increasingly associated with the slave diet and with that of the poor and underprivileged, including gens du couleur libres (free people of colour). Describing these consumption patterns of Irish salt beef, Vignols considers this demographic outline:
This salt beef, which several metropolitan ports in the eighteenth century brought annually to our colonies in America in the tens of thousands of barrels, who were the consumers? Almost always the answer is too brief: the slaves. We always forget that it was largely consumed by the indentured labourers as long as the institution of indentureship existed; also by poor people, whether they be free people of colour or those that the agrarian aristocracy liked to call 'poor whites' [petits blancs]. We must remember, however, that the percentage of it consumed by slaves, given their proportionate population, was still the highest. 96 Debien also comments on this early dietary democracy linking poor whites and African slaves: of three traits characterizing the mid seventeenthcentury diet of slaves, Debien argues, the first is that '. . . their food was the same of that of the engage´s who formed, let us remember, the largest number of white settlers . . . As a staple of their diet, blacks and whites all consumed Irish salt beef . . .'
97 Indeed, in this crucial early period when the colonial dietary regime that would have such long-lasting effects was being formed, slave-owners consumed Irish beef as well. Writing in 1667 when the trade in foreign provisions was still in the hands of the Dutch, the legendary Dominican missionary, Jean-Baptiste du Tertre, 'the Herodotus of the Antilles', described its consumption as follows:
The master of the House is supplied with meat when Vessels arrive and he buys as many barrels of beef, or of lard, as he needs for his provision. He distributes a certain quantity per week to his slaves, but not more than half a pound per day per slave . . . his own table is normally supplied with this salt meat which comes from Europe . . .
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The question that arises naturally in this reflection on the formative period of the colonial diet in the French Caribbean relates to alternatives to salt beef, particularly to beef that necessitated such circuitous provisioning. Why was no acceptable substitute found that could be supplied locally, or least less expensively? Salted tortoise was one option pursued specifically in relation to the slave diet, although it too seems to have followed an unexpectedly complicated route. Savary des Bruslons described the vessels that departed from Nantes with loads of salt to fish off the waters of Cape Verde. Once loaded with tortoise freshly salted, the vessels would sail across the Atlantic for the Caribbean, where '. . . Colonists would buy it for the subsistence of their Slaves [Ne`gres]'. 99 Vignols likewise described a Cape Verde salt-tortoise expedition at the end of the seventeenth century whose final destination was the slave colonies in the Caribbean. He observes, however, that the reasoning behind these ventures displayed a somewhat 'mediocre empiricism': the waters of the Caribbean were not short of tortoise, nor did the islands lack in salt. 100 The more obvious choice would have been salt cod, another colonial Atlantic commodity of immense value that was indeed consumed in massive quantities in the Caribbean, although much more by the slaves on the English-occupied islands. Salt cod was present in the French slave diet: it appears in the lists of merchandise shipped from French ports to the islands; it figures in travel accounts; and article 22 of the Code Noir stipulated that slave-owners distribute weekly to their slaves '. . . two pounds of salt beef or three pounds of fish . . . ' 101 However, it always appears as a second choice or less popular substitute, and a salt-cod trade never reached the point of being able to support growing populations in the French Antilles, even though the French in this period were among the principal players in the Newfoundland cod fishery. By the 1670s, this ancient fishery, which for centuries had seen Basque, Norman, Portuguese, Spanish and English fishermen navigate the waters of the Gulf of Saint Lawrence, had become a Franco-English monopoly, characterized by small permanent settlements on the south and south-east coasts of Newfoundland, in Plaisance (French) and Saint John (English). 102 Although the English arrived much later than the French, they formed and sustained permanent territorial settlements more quickly. The French cod fishery was heavily centred on the production of morue verte (salt cod), in which French vessels loaded with enough salt for the season's catch would cross the North Atlantic, fish for cod, then clean and salt their catch at sea without depending on land-based settlements. The French also produced morue se`che (dried cod), although less of it than either English transatlantic or resident fishermen, or, for that matter, than the English colonists who were to an increasing degree establishing themselves along the North American eastern seaboard and fishing Newfoundland waters. This cod, which required less salt and lasted three times longer than morue verte, was only slightly salted but, crucially, was hung to dry on land-based scaffolds -in this way, the correlation was established between territorial settlements, colonial affiliation and processing method.
Historian Jean-Pierre Poussou asserts that this division explains why the right to fish off of Newfoundland was always more valuable to the French than possessing territorial settlements in the region. 103 Certainly when the French lost all territorial claims to Newfoundland following the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, this right was all they retained (other than the relatively insignificant islands of St Pierre and Miquelon), and it largely dictated the kind of cod they produced -morue verte. The vigorous markets for this cod were primarily France itself and southern Europe. The result was, as JeanFranc¸ois Brie`re argues, that even when the French established their bustling entrepoˆt at Louisbourg on Iˆle-Royale (today's Cape Breton Island) -which as of 1713 functioned more than any other as a New World French trading hub which could provision the French Antilles -the French had no economic interest in selling the bulk of their cargos there. Indeed the largest part of the cod (morue se`che) that made its way to Martinique, Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue did indeed come through Louisbourg. Most of it however was supplied by New England fishermen who could easily and cheaply supply all the expanding Caribbean markets because of their dense land-based settlements in the region. 104 Although it was to their benefit in other ways, concludes Brie`re, this lack of territorial claim was an immense disadvantage that the French could not overcome in their attempts to provision their Caribbean colonies with their own cod. Moreover, the French loss of Louisbourg in 1758 coincided with the most intense period of colonial, and demographic, expansion on the islands. These factors together produced a situation where '. . . France had less and less at its disposal as the century progressed, whereas the demand in the French islands grew and grew during the same period'. 105 Why salt beef from Ireland, instead of salt cod from Newfoundland? Clearly, the answer lies to a large degree in the Atlantic commodity networks of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Provisioning networks responded in the first place to the requirements of a traditional naval diet, shared by most European powers, which developed in accordance with the vicissitudes of colonial expansion. That is, as we have seen, salt cod could never replace salt beef in the French slave diet, although the carbohydrate base of this diet remained almost entirely locally derived. These networks were then strengthened, traced and retraced because of the demand from booming colonial economies: innumerable barrels of sugar, tobacco, coffee and indigo crossed the Atlantic in exchange for millions of enslaved humans and equally incalculable amounts of flour, salt beef, wine, lard and canvas.
Both provisioning and export-commodity networks adhered largely if not perfectly to 'national' affiliations, and thus were vulnerable to the ruinous economic as well as geopolitical effects of intra-European warfare. France's vast territorial losses after 1763 were far outweighed by the retention of its sugar colonies, it seemed to Choiseul, the Secretary of State for the Marine who negotiated the Treaty of Paris, and opinion in France was with him. 106 But the effect on provisioning networks within the French new world, never particularly robust, was catastrophic, and mushrooming populations of the Antilles were tied more than ever to continentally-based merchant networks on the one hand, and to New England smugglers on the other.
However, the prominence of salt beef in the social histories of the pre-revolutionary French Antilles is equally tied to the modalities of French colonial implantation in the Caribbean and to the institution of transatlantic slavery. Food provision was a crisis that defined all European Atlantic colonies which were dependent on slave labour and which devoted the vast preponderance of land to the cultivation of export commodities. Slaves were slaves, first and foremost, because they owned nothingspecifically, they owned neither their own time nor the material means to support themselves. 107 Forcibly displaced from West Africa in the hundreds of thousands, and brought to a string of islands in the Caribbean, they were compelled to exist and labour alongside a numerically tiny but equally diasporic and sea-based European population. Their subsistence was a matter of concern to their owners who required a functional labour force, but who barely followed the repeated injunctions to feed slaves at minimal levels -when conflicts between this concern and the profitability of their land occurred, slaves' welfare was largely abandoned. Slaves' subsistence became a matter of accident and contingency -of gardens tended haphazardly on small plots of land not able to be used in sugar-cane cultivation, and of dependence on the periodic distribution of transatlantic imports of salted meat. Thus was born a diet of cassava and Irish salt beef; a diet of easily-grown local crops and naval provisions.
The history of salt beef in the French sugar colonies therefore has a double face. The first is one of lucrative colonial commodity networks: of Irish merchants in Bordeaux and French wine in Dublin, and of exponentially growing wealth in these Atlantic corners as they benefited from the consuming slave populations that propelled the Caribbean sugar economy into the eighteenth century. On the islands themselves, however, salt beef was associated not with wealth but with desperation and famine. To conclude I will return to Jean-Charles de Baas, governor-general of the ıles franc¸aises de l'Ame´rique, and to his letter to Colbert in 1672, responding to the ban of Irish salt beef of the previous November. His desperation is palpable.
There is a universal and deeply-felt grievance held by the inhabitants of St Christophe -it is the lack of flour and of beef, particularly the latter, which will be the destruction of the slaves because they can't live without it . . . The strong ones will become maroons and deserters, and the weak ones, such as the women and children, will become weaker and die, as we have already seen in many families. You must know absolutely, Monseigneur, that beef is the true meat of the slaves, and they absolutely require it if we want them to work. . . . People [colonists] are worrying about this lack because they don't see a way to feed their slaves, who detest bacon and only eat it if they have to . . . If you would know the true diet of the slaves, Monseigneur, they live on three different kinds of roots, which they call potato, yam and manioc; from the latter they make cassava, their daily bread. To this the colonists add two pounds of salt beef per week per working slave; and this work lasts day and night because out of twenty-four hours, the slave has only four in which to rest. If these miserable people don't have beef, how is it possible that they can continue, subsisting only on roots? And it is certain that if we have no beef from Ireland, they will not be fed on French beef . . .
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This description of slaves' consumption reveals the extent of their dispossession and the limits of their agency. To die, to run away and become maroon, to refuse to eat bacon except when forced: such were their alternatives. This letter also makes explicit the links between the local ('manioc, potato, yam') and the transatlantic in the provisioning of slaves. Thus it signals how food provision, subsistence and consumption reveal an expanding Atlantic world rooted in the social lives of the slaves upon which it depended. Salt beef connects slaves' consumption to the development of the French sugar economy in the eighteenth century along networks that stretched from Ireland to France and across the Atlantic to Martinique, Guadeloupe and Saint-Domingue. It also signals how the study of consumption can cast new light on the historical geographies of the Atlantic world.
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